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interests between developmental objectives
and a concern for future generations. Given
scientific uncertainty, future generations may
not even benefit from current generations’
 sacrifices and the latter may be deeply altered
by such policies, especially from a distribu-
tional perspective. Reflecting on our relati-
onship to future generations, Dr. Pierron
indirectly echoes such a concern. According
to him, our need to imagine future generati-
ons must be neither guided by a “heuristic of
fear”, nor by that of unalterable idolized fu-
ture generations. 
Ms. Kouadio’s very informative article on the
legal provisions in Côte-d’Ivoire to protect fu-
ture generations represents an original case
study. The particular circumstances in which
developing countries find themselves with re-
spect to environmental protection is note-
worthy. Indeed, this article makes it necessary
to consider: first, the fairness of restricting the
use of natural resources by current generati-
ons acknowledged to be impoverished (a dif-
ficulty equally faced in setting a just savings
principle that would apply to the first and
poorest generations), second, the internatio-
nal dimension and share of responsibility by
other countries in resource depletion and
lastly, the additional diﬃculties of enforcing
environmental protection within a develo-
ping country (e.g. due to the fragility of state
structure). 
Dr. Robichaud and Professor Turmel’s article
on cultural patrimony enlarges the debate of
what type of transfer should be made to fu-
ture generations in a generally environment-
centred debate. The article opens up the pos-
sibility that the transmission of cultural
heritage has ambiguous benefits and costs.
While fascinating, the comparability of such
public goods with environmental goods, or
the nature and extent of the demands needed
to appropriately preserve cultural diversity
will undoubtedly require more analysis than
this short article could allow. Languages have
evolved and some have certainly died but it
remains to be appraised whether speakers of
modern languages today live in a less cultu-
rally diverse environment. It also remains to
be argued that cultural goods necessarily re-
place each other: one may love both rock but
also classical music. Proposing the “transmis-
sion of a sane linguistic context and linguistic
diversity” from generation to generation does
not define the content of such obligations or
by whom they should be borne, whether it
entails positive and/or negative demands.
Undoubtedly, this new addition to the litera-
ture of intergenerational justice will help to
boost the francophone discussion of the
topic. Overall, the book’s greatest merits lies
in its capacity to reveal the tensions inherent
to intergenerational justice itself and with
other major social and economic objectives
such as economic growth and intrageneratio-
nal justice. We might regret the absence of
discussion between the texts, including bet-
ween the theoretical proposals and more em-
pirical case studies. This allows, however, the
reader to chart the large number of theoreti-
cal lines and practical diﬃculties present in
this field. Thematically, the dominance of ar-
ticles on environmental aﬀairs and pensions
reflects industrialised countries’ most topical
concerns within the field of intergenerational
justice. Nevertheless, while politicians are
summoned to take decisions very soon for the
sake of future generations, the philosophical
debate remains fiercely open. 
Dan Sylvain and Joerg Tremmel (eds.) (2010):
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ith Future People – A Moderate
Consequentialist Account of our
Obligations to Future Generati-
ons, Prof. Tim Mulgan has given us a book of
profound worth on the subject of our duties
to future generations and, indeed much more
besides. His earlier book The Demands of
Consequentialism (2002) was described as
“powerful and impressive” (Chappell, 2002,
p. 897) and “a formidable achievement” (Eg-
gleston, 2009, p. 125). The same can be said
for this methodical work, which attempts to
show that a ‘Combined Consequentialism’
can oﬀer a superlative account of what we
owe to those not yet living. The author exhi-
bits scholarly patience, an openness to ack-
nowledge limitations and a willingness to ti-
relessly search out diﬃcult problems to
confront his own ideas with. 
Establishing moral obligations is complicated
by the fact that “our actions have little impact
on those who are dead, considerable impact
on those currently alive, and potentially enor-
mous impact on those who will live in the fu-
ture” (p. 1). In consideration of this, Mulgan
presents  three basic intuitions ‘The Basic
Wrongness Intuition’, ‘The Basic Collective
Intuition’ and the ‘The Basic Liberty Intui-
tion’, which are, in a sense, the launch pad for
the remainder of the book. The first is that it
is wrong to gratuitously create a child whose
life contains nothing but suﬀering. The se-
cond is that the present generation should not
needlessly cause great suﬀering to future ge-
nerations. Finally, the third is that reproduc-
tive choice is morally open. Accept these
plausible claims and one is set to begin map-
ping out the moral terrain in this area. Yet, as
Mulgan is only acutely aware, placing em-
phasis on intuitions is fraught with danger.
Certainly, the use of intuitions, to make “the
journey from the familiar to the familiar” as
John Wisdom (in Strawson, 1949, p. 259)
put it, is unavoidable in moral philosophy.
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However, Mulgan has taken great care to
guard against the danger of giving too much
weight to our intuitions in this book.
The author asks what theory can best fulfil
these three intuitions in consideration of fu-
ture generations? Non-consequentialist theo-
ries, he claims, struggle with ‘The Basic
Wrongness Intuition’ and ‘The Basic Collec-
tive Intuition’, for the same essential reason: A
person-aﬀecting theory struggles to compare
existence with non-existence, no matter how
horrendous the possible life. Alternatively,
consequentialist theories can easily account
for these first two intuitions: “In any plausi-
ble Consequentialist theory, considerable
weight is attached to the well-being of future
humans” (p. 200). The notable strength of
the non-consequentialist person-aﬀecting ap-
proach is that it straightforwardly accommo-
dates the ‘The Basic Liberty Intuition’ because
parents must be free to make moral decisions
in so far as no persons are harmed by their ac-
tions. The failure to recognise as of yet non-
existing people safeguards the reproductive
choice of parents. Meanwhile, a ‘Simple Con-
sequentialism’ (SC), which states that ‘the
right action in any situation is the one that, of
all the actions available to that agent at the
time, produces the best possible outcome” (p.
17) is doomed to oblige parents to continue
to have another child if overall welfare is in-
creased. Therefore, SC fails the Basic Liberty
Intuition because it is too demanding. 
The demandingness objection is a close rela-
tion of the concept of integrity as used by the
late Bernard Williams, who memorably insi-
sted that “we are not agents of the universal
satisfaction system” (1973, p. 118). Of
course, for some the demandingness objec-
tion is erroneous and a symptom of the bour-
geois comforts of the intelligentsia. Others,
who may have religious inclinations, might
say that there should be no limits to what we
should give to the poor and needy for the sake
of God. However, Mulgan appears to be right
to accept demandingness as an objection,
especially as we consider future generations,
where temporal floodgates open up the pos-
sibility of an overwhelming accumulation of
moral duty. As Hooker put it: “the deman-
dingness objection may appeal to some dis-
reputable characters [but] the objection
retains considerable force” (Hooker, 1990, p.
71). Thus, Mulgan knows that he must find
some way for consequentialism to provide for
the three intuitions while protecting repro-
ductive choice, establishing justifiable obliga-
tions to future people but, also, not be too
demanding. 
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What of “the dominant contemporary rival
in the area of intergenerational justice” (p.
24); the social contract tradition? Contrac-
tualist accounts, as represented by Rawls and
Gauthier are deemed to be problematic for
future generations since, amongst other
things, they do not appropriately account for
the nurturing of the basic needs of present
and, indeed, future autonomous moral
agents. 
After showing these contractarian approaches
are not without criticism, Mulgan discusses
Scheﬄer’s influential reflection on conse-
quentalist and deontological theories. Scheﬀ-
ler integrated restrictions and prerogatives
into what he considered to be the legitimate
core of consequentialism in order to ack-
nowledge the integrity of the agent.  In what
he called the ‘Hybrid View’, presented in The
Rejection of Consequentialism, Scheﬄer iden-
tified an ‘agent centred prerogative’ as having
“the eﬀect of denying that one is always re-
quired to produce the best overall states of af-
fairs...” (1994, p. 5) and an ‘agent centred
restriction’ as having “the eﬀect of denying
that there is any non-agent relative principle
for ranking overall states of aﬀairs from best
to worst such that it is always permissible to
produce the best available state of aﬀairs”
(1994, p. 2). These structural features built
into consequentialism defend the theory from
heavy criticism by respecting the moral signi-
ficance of the personal point of view. Mulgan
recognises this as a promising move towards
allowing agents to give preference to their
own meaningful endeavours and a means of
overcoming the demandingness objection.
Ultimately, however, Scheﬄer’s theory has si-
gnificant failings for a theory of intergenera-
tional justice because it is “insuﬃcient either
to ground the broad prerogatives of common
sense, or to provide the intuitively necessary
restrictions” (p. 104). One central reason for
this is the individualist perspective of the Hy-
brid View, one also pervading SC, that only
asks what the individual should do assuming
all others continue as they are. Being unable
to assess or justify behaviours in their collec-
tive consequences is, Mulgan points out, cri-
tical in the context of future generations
(p.127).
Thus, Mulgan needs a collective theory and
he finds one in Rule Consequentialism (RC),
where “an act is morally right if and only if it
would be judged to follow from the optimal
set of rules by someone who had internalized
those rules and had grown up in a society
where such internalization was the norm” (p.
184). Hence, from the outset, there is an ex-
plicit consideration of the wider community
in our moral obligations. The aim of RC is
not to assess any rule alone but rather to iden-
tify the full set of rules, or the code, which so-
ciety should undertake. RC respects people as
fallible, hence the ease with which a code can
be internalised by a society and the cost of it
being taught are factored into its evaluation.
Since RC is concerned with the passing on of
the ideal code to posterity, it must necessarily
reflect on our forward looking duties, a clear
plus in Mulgan’s search for an appropriate
theory. 
If a consequentialist account is to be success-
ful there must be a particular view of the
value that is being promoted. Thus, Mulgan
moves to defend the Lexical Claim: “If x is le-
xically more valuable than y, then, once we
have a suﬃcient amount of x, no amount of y
can compensate for a significant reduction in
x” (p. 67). This forms a central part of his
book. The success of the lexical claim for
Mulgan requires that between lives there can
be a diﬀerence in kind, not just degree. Lives
above the level set by the lexical claim are de-
fined broadly “in terms of the successful pur-
suit of valuable goals” and “certain
connections between goals, agency, and com-
munity” (p. 70). Since goals are formed in so-
cial interaction within a community, one
cannot rise above the lexical level in isolation.
Lexical levels are culturally dependent, that is
there are contextual interpretations of the le-
xical level, but this is not to be considered a
move towards cultural relativism. Diﬀerent
interpretations of the lexical level can exist
with varying social frameworks. However,
only a certain number of interpretations can
be reasonably justified within any social fra-
Intergenerational Justice Review
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mework, this Mulgan terms the ‘lexical thres-
hold’ (pp. 270-271). People adopting the
ideal code will undertake ‘quasi-lexical levels’,
which means they “knowingly act in a man-
ner best explained by supposing that they
adopt something broadly analogous to a
quasi-lexical threshold of some unspecified
sort” (p. 145). Those who have rejected Mul-
gan’s recognition of the demandingness ob-
jection will also no doubt be perturbed by the
laxity of this moral guide, with its quasi-lexi-
cal level. Nevertheless, it should be borne in
mind that a central criticism of RC accounts
has been that they reduce moral agents to
rule-following automatons. Therefore, it is
important for Mulgan to allow room for the
agent to act. Consequently, those who have
accepted the ideal code, and its quasi-lexical
level, “realize that, when they pursue their
own goals at the expense of the impersonal
good, and especially when they set thresholds
(...) they are acting as if there were a morally
significant diﬀerence in kind between what
they pursue and what they forgo, such that
the former is not reducible to any available
amount of the latter” (p. 144). Thus RC, with
a quasi-lexical level, can help overcome some
of Mulgan’s original worries about what
would be asked of us under a consequentialist
view of our obligations to future people. Mo-
reover, Mulgan sees it as quite plausible that
parental obligations can be part of the ideal
code because, for one, the costs of teaching
the code would be reduced thanks to our na-
tural inclination to protect our own children
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, all children
in our society. Consequently, he arrives at the
flexible lexical rule which tells one to “repro-
duce if and only if you want to, so long as you
are reasonably sure that your child will enjoy a
life above the lexical level, and very sure that
the risk of your child falling below the zero
level is very small” [Emphasis in the original]
(p. 174).  
There are, Mulgan acknowledges, grievous
problems for RC. In particular, the issue of
partial compliance is deeply problematic for
the theory as it undermines the code’s tea-
ching and uptake by future generations. Mul-
gan argues that demands become
unreasonable when one looks to the obligati-
ons one has beyond one’s own group (one’s
group being those with whom one shares the
goals that give meaning to our lives). Consi-
deration of posterity, especially far into the fu-
ture, exacerbates the negative eﬀects of partial
compliance and thus the problems for RC.
However, instead of abandoning RC, Mulgan
argues for something at once conservative and
yet extremely radical. First, he builds upon
the sturdiest aspects of the SC, RC and the
Hybrid View to provide a ‘Combined Con-
sequentialism’. Secondly, he splits morality
into two loosely bordered realms. Two classi-
fication schemes are brought together to or-
ganise these realms. The first separates
according to the moral status of the indivi-
dual who is the object of moral concern; bet-
ween the spheres of bare humanity and that
of the moral community. The second divides
according to the eﬀects of one’s acts on others’
well-being and thus relies on the distinction
between needs and goals. The two schemes
map onto each other to give the Realm of Ne-
cessity where “we, as active members of a
moral community, encounter someone who
currently lacks the resources or capacities to
participate fully in that community” (p. 345)
and the Realm of Reciprocity where “we, as
active members of our moral community, de-
cide how we will interact in pursuit of our
joint and individual goals” (p. 345). This di-
vision is required in a world where “no moral
based on one route alone can hope to provide
a full account of the relationship between va-
lues and reasons” (p. 346). Mulgan claims
that RC oﬀers the best account in the Realm
of Reciprocity, SC works best in the Realm of
Necessity and the Hybrid View balances the
two realms. Where does this leave our obli-
gations to future generations? Regarding re-
productive choices, Mulgan suggests we see
these as in the Realm of Reciprocity. Mulgan
concedes that determining and fulfilling the
obligations we have to future people of my
own community “straddles the two realms”
because the lack of reciprocity between non-
overlapping generations places such obligati-
ons in the Realm of Necessity, while rule
consequentialist considerations for the pas-
sing on of the moral code also suggests that
they belong to the Realm of Reciprocity. He
concludes that this can be accommodated by
the bi-partite schema and does not invoke a
need for a third realm (p. 350).
The book is far more nuanced and wide ran-
ging than can be expressed here but to con-
clude some issues of concern should be raised. 
Future People suggests that there rests in the
wings the details of a value theory, pointing as
he does to an unpublished manuscript entit-
led “Valuing the Future” (p. 252). While he
admits that “any complete Rule Consequen-
tialism needs a complete account of value” (p.
142), he also hopes that his central arguments
can be supported by the sketch of a value
theory provided. Nevertheless, how this value
theory would be filled in raises questions.
Mulgan acknowledges that he has “assumed
that human well-being is the only relevant
source of value. Other values, such as envi-
ronmental values and the well-being of ani-
mals, and various possible holistic evaluations
of human communities have been put to one
side” (p. 79). In fact, intriguingly, his current
work is based on an ‘Ananthropocentric Pur-
posivism’. This proposed theory promises to
outline how the universe has a non-human-
centred purpose that supports “a liberal im-
partial morality built on genuinely objective
values” (Mulgan, 2010).  Mulgan tells us “a
lexical level might feature either in the foun-
dational theory only, or in the agent’s theory,
or both” (p. 62) but how divergent would a
non-human centred foundational theory’s le-
xical level be in relation to that expressed
under a rule consequentialist ideal code?
There are valid reasons why Mulgan has avoi-
ded fleshing out his value theory here but, no-
netheless, the query persists how compatible
can the projects of value promotion be when
they alternatively engage lexical levels based
on non-human-centred and human-centred
conceptions of value?
There is another question with relation to
value. Mulgan recognises the potential circu-
larity of RC: “The purpose of the ideal code
is to determine what is morally permissible.
Yet we cannot compare competing codes
until we have determined which projects are
morally permissible, as only then can we
know which projects are valuable” (fn 36,
pp.157-158). He proposes a viable escape
route via an independently construed under-
standing of ‘valuable ends’, whereby “...this
circle is avoided if we can find an account of
the notion of ‘valuable ends’ which does not
presuppose a theory of right action. We can
then specify the value to be promoted wit-
hout circular reference to the content of the
ideal code” (fn 36, p.158). However, Mulgan
seems to have closed this route oﬀ to himself.
Of the two ways consequentialists can ap-
proach value, that is a foundationalist strategy
(a theory of right action is only derived when
a full theory of value is determined) and an
independence strategy (develop a theory of
right action and value theory separately, reu-
niting them when completed), Mulgan says:
“both assume we can construct a theory of
value in isolation from our theory of right ac-
tion. I believe this is a mistake...Attempts to
construct an intuitive value theory operate
(often implicitly) with a theory of right ac-
tion” (p.55). Thus, if the possibility of a di-
stinct value theory apart from a theory of
right action is not available, how is the circu-
Intergenerational Justice Review
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larity that Mulgan correctly fears avoided for
a moderate consequentialism, including, in
part, an ideal code? 
Thirdly, RC gives weight to our psychological
make-up in attempting to identify the ideal
code. It seems plausible that people could
have a disposition towards complete theories,
or at least, the veneer of completeness. If
people prefer a theory that suggests it can ac-
count for everything this may undermine
Mulgan’s view of RC. His astute discussion of
risk and uncertainty argues that their interre-
lated eﬀect “justifies the Rule Consequentia-
list reluctance to seek more detailed moral
conclusions than the complexity of the sub-
ject matter permits” (p. 254). Yet how can this
be balanced with the possibility that people
may desire not only “more detailed moral
conclusions” but the appearance of a theory
with all the answers. Giving the false impres-
sion of completeness may not be a problem
for Mulgan’s RC if it could be shown to lead
to better results: “transparency [is] not neces-
sarily a virtue” (p. 155). At times Mulgan
seems to be advocating an esoteric morality
in the vein of Sidgwick who himself said: “. .
. on Utilitarian principles, it may be right to
do and privately recommend, under certain
circumstances, what it would not be right to
advocate openly; it may be right to teach
openly to one set of persons what it would be
wrong to teach to others; it may be conceiva-
bly right to do, if it can be done with com-
parative secrecy, what it would be wrong to
do in the face of the world; and even, if per-
fect secrecy can be reasonably expected, what
it would be wrong to recommend by private
advice and example” (1907, p. 489). If this is
Mulgan’s view, he certainly departs from
Hooker’s (2002, p. 85) perspective of RC:
“Such paternalistic duplicity would be mo-
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rally wrong, even if it would maximize the ag-
gregate good.” Mulgan, at least in this book,
seems not to have oﬀered us protection from
the Noble Lie.
Lastly, Mulgan admits that the Realm of Ne-
cessity and the Realm of Reciprocity are not
strictly separated: “The boundaries between
moral realms are fluid...Any attempt to sepa-
rate the two realms neatly and completely is
bound to be an oversimplification” (p. 346).
Accepting this, one may still query the nature
of the division. We are told that RC is appli-
cable in the Realm of Reciprocity, which pre-
vails between members of a moral
community whereby “the notion of moral
community...is of a society of comparatively
equal moral agents who can interact in mu-
tually advantageous ways in pursuit of their
goals” (p. 343). It seems to me the ideal moral
code that RC would promote must include
rules for distinguishing between those who
can be considered part of my moral commu-
nity and those who are not: One must know
how to make this distinction in order to ap-
propriately learn and apply the code. Hence
the division of realms of morality itself must
be acceptable as part of the code. The need to
teach to people that there are two realms of
morality as a result of two kinds of lives may
be prohibitively costly for the code.
These issues aside, in Future People we have a
solid piece of philosophical analysis which in-
vigorates the debate on intergenerational ju-
stice by bringing a long needed robust
consequentialist perspective on this topic.
Moreover, Mulgan shows that the issue of in-
tergenerational justice has important impli-
cations for public policy and the nature of
morality itself. His work should take centre
stage in further scholarship in this area.
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Richard P. Hiskes: The Human Right to a Green Future – 
Environmental Rights and Intergenerational Justice 
Reviewed by Joseph Burke
ichard P. Hiskes is based at the
University of Connecticut as a pro-
fessor of political theory, some one
thousand five hundred miles from the BP oil
disaster site that began to haemorrhage on
April 20th, 2010. Despite the distance, it
seems fair to assume that the political im-
plications of the slick black tide have drifted
north as far as the Nutmeg State. In the in-
troduction of his book, The Human Right to
a Green Future – Environmental Rights and
Intergenerational Justice, Hiskes pre-empts
the frustration Americans now feel in trying
to hold the fourth largest company in the
world to account:  “Environmentalism
needs a new and more muscular political vo-
cabulary grounded in today’s central politi-
cal ideas of human rights and justice” (p. 2). 
Consequently, Hiskes moves to develop a ju-
stification for environmental human rights,
which he understands as the foundation for
intergenerational environmental justice.
This is, as he himself acknowledges, an ar-
R
